

THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

ISSUED BY THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

4 NOVEMBER 1962
~~**TOP SECRET**~~

1. Cuba/Bloc

a. Little of significance was produced by the six low-altitude missions flown on Saturday. Two airfields, two ports and one former MRBM launch site were covered. There was no clarification of the situation at La Isabella dockside nor was our knowledge of the status of the IL-28s advanced.

b. We have no readout yet of yesterday's U-2 mission.

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
f. A fourth delivery of IL-28s apparently was made to Cuba about 20 October, just a few days before the US quarantine measures were enacted.

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o. Among the Latin American delegates at the UN, the feeling is widespread that even though the missile threat be removed, the problem of Castro remains. Although some believe he has lost heavily in prestige, there is growing concern that a commitment from us not to invade in exchange for removal of the missiles would be like winning a battle and losing the war, if Castro remains.

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2. Cuba-Military

a. The Cubans may try to mount round the clock fighter patrols and attempt to intercept our reconnaissance flights. 50X1

c. It may have been training, but early yesterday two Cuban MIGs were scrambled after an "enemy aircraft" which flew near the Santa Clara base. We had no planes in the area at that time.

e. We do not know what it is all about yet, but a 29-member Cuban military mission was due to arrive Moscow yesterday from Havana via Czech civil air carrier. 50X1

3. Cuba-USSR Propaganda

a. Moscow has issued (on 2 November) its first commentary on a UN supervisory role in the Cuban crisis. The treatment suggests the USSR will try to hold any UN verification and

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supervision of dismantling and removal of missiles to the absolute minimum, not only because of Castro's adamant opposition but also because of the dangerous precedent this would create.

b. One of the participants in a round table discussion on Moscow radio declared that "certain US policy-makers have a distorted view of the UN role in solving salient problems" and "would like to repeat the Congo experience."

c. He then agreed with another participant that these people would like to use the UN as a shield to interfere in Cuba's domestic affairs.

d. The third participant, in purporting to review the role of the UN in settling the conflict, makes no reference to UN inspection and appears to envisage no further tasks for the UN in regard to Cuba following U Thant's trip.

e. A related commentary beamed to Latin America asserted that "the indispensable condition for conversations aimed at peaceful settlement... should be noninterference in the internal affairs of Cuba."

f. Moscow is still putting out the line that with continuation of the "blockade" and continued aerial surveillance, we are not living up to our half of the bargain.

For The President Only—Top Secret

4. Cuba/OAS

a. Venezuela's Foreign Minister is in Washington today planning to address the OAS Council on Cuban inspired subversion and sabotage in his country. He has some "proof" which he will present [redacted]

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b. [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] saboteurs at-
tacked [redacted] oil fields
in Venezuela [redacted]

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5. Bloc armed forces

Soviet bloc armed forces apparently have relaxed somewhat the status of defensive readiness they have been on for the past week. East European forces are engaged in normal field training and small unit training is resuming

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6. USSR

a. Strange things have begun appearing in Pravda's pages in the last few weeks.

b. We have already noted that on 21 October Pravda reprinted Yevtushenko's poem "Stalin's Heirs" warning of the resurgence of Stalinism in the USSR. Its appearances in Pravda is most unusual.

c. Little more than a week later, Pravda republished the full text of an editorial from the Mongolian party paper concerning the ouster in September (for fostering nationalism, wrecking party unity, excessive zeal in denigrating the cult of personality, etc) of Mongolian party secretary and politburo member Tumur-Ochir, an in and out nobody not of himself worthy of such attention

d. If one chooses to do so, this piece can be read as a devastating indictment of Khrushchev. It can also, however, be construed as an attempt to steal the thunder of his enemies in the Chinese Communist camp.

e. As if to set things straight, Pravda yesterday published an unqualified endorsement of Khrushchev's leadership signed by none other than old warhorse Kliment Voroshilov, who was denounced last year as a member of the Stalinist-oriented "antiparty group." Obviously written at Khrushchev's behest, its appearance at all and its praise for Khrushchev's handling of the Cuban crisis look defensive.

f. Manifestations of the eye-gouging that sometimes goes on in the Kremlin are rare and their interpretation is risky. Even so, we are mindful that it was a party paper (in East Germany) which gave us an early clue that Malenkov was in trouble.

g. We are still puzzling this matter out (comparing texts and translations, etc.). It is at least safe to say, however, that the evidence, conflicting though it seems, shows that Khrushchev knows he is vulnerable to an opposition which not only is still around but has recently taken heart.

h. If there is a showdown it may come at the forthcoming central committee plenum

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7. USSR-Eastern Europe

a. Khrushchev's consultations with East European bosses this past week have taken the unusual form of a series of separate bilateral talks.

b. There is a sense of urgency in the situation.

c. The latest to make the trek was Bulgarian party chief Zhivkov who has his own trouble with Stalinists at home and who had to interrupt urgent preparations for a party congress scheduled to open tomorrow in order, all of a sudden, to make a one-day trip to Moscow.

d. Under the circumstances, it looks to us as though something more than just an explanation of the Cuban affair is afoot, but we cannot put our finger on it yet.

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9. South Vietnam

a. A number of high military officers in South Vietnam feel a major political shake-up, including the ouster of Diem and his brother, has to take place before security can be restored.

b. They resent Diem's failure to act against high civilian officials tainted by a lottery scandal, and at least one of them is actively planning a coup.

10. Yemen

a. The royalist tribes (some are more anti-republican than they are pro-Imam) control a number of strong points in the hills in the east and northeast part of the country.

c. Now, armed with light weapons, Badr has mounted an attack on republican positions near Harad, in the north which he hopes to capture preparatory to an eventual push southward along the coast.

d. He had hoped for a coordinated strike by forces under Hasan's son in the east near Harib along the Marib-Sana road. We have no word that this materialized, nor are we aware of any coordination among the disparate tribal forces.

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e.

Badr

had better stick to the hills. We doubt he will press on with it; if he does, he will fail.

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f. The royalist force is small, probably capable of holding for some time much of the area it now occupies, but we rate its chances of going anywhere from there very low.

11. Algiers-USSR-Cuba

a. We believe Ben Bella may have offered Algerian facilities (probably the modern Maison Blanche airfield near Algiers) to the Soviets for staging flights to Cuba.

b. If they do use Algiers in place of Conakry, the Soviets would be able to use only their largest aircraft for the flight all the way to Cuba.

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NOTES

- A. UN-India-China: The neutralists at the UN have decided not to take any initiative there on the Sino-Indian conflict.
- B. USSR: Mikoyan's wife died in Moscow yesterday after an illness of several weeks; he has said he will continue his talks in Havana.

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